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Abstract
In this study, we investigate the relationship between receptivity to novelty and
innovation. Consumers’ receptivity to novelty, as an individual propensity toward
new goods, might be perceived to encourage innovation at the aggregate level un-
ambiguously. On analyzing data from the World Values Survey and the World
Intellectual Property Organization, however, we find that there is an inverted U-
shaped relationship between average receptivity and innovation at country level;
receptivity may not always be conducive to innovation. To capture a mechanism
behind this counterintuitive fact, we develop a new dynamic general equilibrium
model with the understanding that innovation consists of two separate activities of
inventing new goods and introducing them to the society. In our model, consumer
receptivity encourages firms to invent but discourages them from introducing. Inter-
acted with population size and the elasticity of substitution, these opposing forces
generate a non-monotonic relationship. While economies with moderate receptiv-
ity can achieve sustained innovation and thereby long-run growth, those with too
much or too little receptivity are likely to be caught in an underdevelopment trap,
in which innovations eventually fail. These results suggest a theory that explains
the inverted-U.
JEL Classification Codes : E32; O40; Z10
Keywords : Openness to novelty; aversion to novelty; underdevelopment traps; en-
dogenous growth; innovation cycles
∗The authors are grateful to Taro Akiyama, Martine Carre´-Tallon, Nicola Coniglio, Mario Curucini,
Gene Grossman, Tomoya Hanibuchi, Keisaku Higashida, Takeo Hori, Jun-ichi Itaya, Takashi Kami-
higashi, Yoshimasa Komoriya, Sung-Ho Lee, Junya Masuda, Kiyoshi Matsubara, Koyo Miyoshi, Akira
Momota, Hiroshi Mukunoki, Takumi Naito, Masao Oda, Ryoji Ohdoi, Yuka Ohno, Masayuki Okawa, Rui
Ota, Pascalis Raimondos, Yoichi Sugita, Takaji Suzuki, Yasuhiro Takarada, Yasuo Takatsuki, Yoshihiro
Tomaru, Annalisa Vinella, Akihiko Yanase, and the conference/seminar participants at the Bari-Chukyo
Agreement One-Day Seminar, Economic Theory and Policy Workshop, 2015 IEFS Japan Annual Meet-
ing, Chonnam National University, Copenhagen Business School, Hokkaido University, IE´SEG School
of Management, University of Bari, University of Paris-Dauphine, University of Porto, and Yokohama
National University for their helpful comments and advice on earlier versions of this paper. Yuichi Fu-
rukawa acknowledges the partial financial support of a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) #26780126
and a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) #16H03612. Kenji Sato acknowledges the partial finan-
cial support of a Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellow and a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
#16K03552.
†Corresponding author. Email address: you.furukawa@gmail.com
1
1 Introduction
It is generally believed that people’s receptivity to novelty or new ideas is important for
innovation. For example, Mokyr (1991) writes: “[T]he success of new techniques depends
both on the level of inventive activity and the receptivity of the surrounding economy to
new ideas.” More recently, Fagerberg (2005, 2013) argues that “‘openness’ to new ideas,
solutions, etc. is essential for innovation” because innovation requires people and firms
to “search widely for new ideas, inputs and sources of inspiration.”
Inspection of the data, however, reveals a non-trivial relationship between receptiv-
ity to novelty and innovation. Figure 1 shows the country-level relationship between
innovation (measured by patent applications per million capita, in log) and receptivity
to novelty (measured by whether the people in the country consider that new ideas are
better than old ones).1 The solid line and dotted line respectively show a fitted quadratic
curve and a Lowess smoothing curve of the data. This figure shows that, unconditionally,
innovation tends to be higher at the medium level of receptivity and lower at the two
ends of the receptivity distribution.
What accounts for this seemingly counter-intuitive relationship? Why do individuals’
preferences towards new ideas ambiguously affect aggregate innovation? These questions
provide the motivation for our paper and require a framework where individuals’ prefer-
ences for novelty can be studied. The framework we present for this purpose extends the
research and development (R&D)-based growth model (Romer 1990) to allow for ideas to
be first invented as new goods and, eventually, become either matured to survive as long-
lasting (or “old”) goods or obsolete. The invention (of new ideas as new goods) and the
introduction (of new goods into old goods) both require investments; their profitabilities
are governed by the consumers’ desire for newly-invented goods (or their “receptivity to
novelty”). In this way, “innovation” in our model does not merely refer to an invention
or patent, but also its introduction. This view is akin to Mokyr’s (2004) findings and
many historical events.2
In the model, there are two interactive factors generating the ambiguous effect of
receptivity to novelty on innovation: (a) the market mechanism, which encourages the
development of goods that earn a relatively large profit, and (b) a matching efficiency
effect, which enriches the “innovation-possibilities frontier” by agglomerating new inven-
tions, which are not innovation itself but the origin of “innovation” in the present context.
These two forces are complementary in the sense that, while the latter reduces the cost
for innovation, the former determines the distribution of resources to investments in in-
venting new goods and saving them from obsolescence in each period of time. We will
demonstrate that the receptivity to novelty, together with the elasticity of substitution
between goods, plays an essential role in determining the balance between these two
1In Section 3, we provide a more formal regression analysis of the relationship. Further details about
the data sources and variable definitions are in Data Appendix
2A good example is Crete’s Phaistos Disk in about 1700 B.C. (Diamond 1997), which indicates the
early invention of an efficient printing technique, but it received little social acceptance. Being lost for a
long time, printing technology was reinvented and widely introduced in Renaissance Europe and, then,
spread worldwide. Even for inventions that will eventually take root in society, the path from invention
to acceptance is far from smooth. Steam engines, invented by Thomas Savery (in 1698) and, then, by
Thomas Newcomen (in 1712), would not have been introduced during the Industrial Revolution without
the genius of James Watt (in 1781). If we borrow a term from business, Watt’s activity may be called
“incubation.” This should not be considered a degraded form of invention; rather, incubation—a result
of which is introduction—is as laborious and creative an activity as is invention.
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Figure 1: Receptivity and innovation: Cross-country relationship
Note: Innovation is measured by patent applications per million capita (log) and receptivity is
measured by World Values Survey’s question E046. The solid line is a fitted quadratic curve. The
dotted line is a Lowess smoothing curve.
factors.
The core finding of this study is that only those economies with moderate receptivity
to novelty can achieve self-sustained innovation and growth in the long run; when con-
sumers’ receptivity to novelty is too high or too low, their economy tends to be caught
in an “underdevelopment trap,” in which case new goods are invented over time but all
become obsolete along an equilibrium path, i.e., there is no innovation in the long run.3
The intuition behind our core finding is as follows: On the one hand, when consumers
are too averse to novelty the demand for and profits related to newly-invented goods will
be relatively small so that almost no new goods are invented in the marketplace (through
the market mechanism). Since it shrinks the innovation-possibilities frontier, the cost
incurred by firms in introducing new goods into the society becomes higher (due to the
matching efficiency effect). In equilibrium, only invention occurs, but less actively; there
is no innovation in the long run.4 On the other hand, when consumers are too open to
novelty, the demand for and profits related to newly-invented goods are large, relative
to old goods. In such a scenario, invention is even more profitable than introduction
and there are more new goods to be invented in the marketplace (through the market
mechanism). Although abundant inventions imply a lower cost for innovation (due to
the matching efficiency effect), the economy is specialized in inventing new ideas on an
equilibrium path when consumers are highly open to novelty, yielding, once again, a lack
3Here, the trap can be regarded as a kind of low-level equilibrium trap (Nelson 1956) because, in the
present model, no innovation results in zero long-run growth in national income.
4Note that we assume that new goods rapidly become obsolete without introduction, while introduced
goods take root in the economy to contribute to long-run growth.
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of innovation. Therefore, with too-low or too-high receptivity, the economy is caught in
an underdevelopment trap and has no innovation.
We formally prove that only those economies with moderate receptivity to novelty
can achieve self-sustained innovation and growth in the long run. In this case, both
forces, as explained above, interact with each other, whereby the economy perpetually
fluctuates between periods where new goods are invented and periods where invented
goods are introduced escaping from obsolescence. Over the cycle, innovation persists,
but intermittently.5 Therefore, we conclude that innovation may be depressed by too-
high or too-low receptivity to novelty on the part of the representative consumer (Figure
1).
In some countries, government policies unintentionally affect receptivity to novelty.
For example, in the U.S., the authority of the Department of Health and Human Services
to fund human embryonic stem-cell research had been limited by U.S. Presidential actions
from 2001 to 2009. These limitations were removed by U.S. President Barack Obama in
March 2009.6 The Internet provides another example. Until 1995, the U.S. government
restricted the use of the Internet to non-commercial purposes. Although the market grew
rapidly after deregulation, many market participants had been unwilling to accept the
forthcoming policy change when the removal of the restriction was on the table. Our
result suggests that the government can play a role in promoting innovation by avoiding
excessively high or low receptivity among individuals.
In addition to receptivity to novelty, we focus on two other important factors that
interact with receptivity to affect innovation and growth. The first is gross substitutabil-
ity between goods. The mechanism through which the consumer’s receptivity affects
innovation is at work only when receptivity changes the expenditure share for newly in-
vented goods; it does not work if the elasticity of substitution between goods is equal to
1 (i.e., a Cobb–Douglas case). The second factor is country size. When a country has a
large population, the demand and profit for any firm are larger; this promotes all stages
in the innovation spectrum by making both invention and introduction activities more
profitable. Thus, larger-sized economies are more likely to achieve perpetual innovation.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature
review. Section 3 documents some regression results about the relationship between
receptivity to novelty and innovation at the country-level. Section 4 introduces our basic
framework and derives equilibrium conditions. Section 5 characterizes the equilibrium
dynamics of the model. Section 6 identifies the critical role of receptivity in innovation
and growth in the long run. Section 7 provides an extension of the baseline model,
showing that our economy can also experience dynamic phenomena such as balanced
growth and history dependence, in addition to underdevelopment traps and innovation.
Finally, Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
5In the baseline model, as explained here, an innovative economy is always perpetually cyclical. In
Section 7, however, we will show that it can also stably converge to a unique balanced growth path, by
considering a natural extension of the baseline model.
6For details, see Executive Order 13505 of March 9, 2009, titled “Removing Barriers to Responsible
Scientific Research Involving Human Stem Cells.”
7This is in line with Boserup’s (1965) view that population growth triggers the adoption of new
technology, since people are forced to adopt new technology when their population becomes too large to
be supported by existing technology. It also approximates the empirical finding of Kremer (1993), that
total research output increases with population, given the idea that a higher population means more
potential investors (Kuznets 1960, Simon 1977).
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2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, our paper is closely
related to a growing body of literature on culture and growth. Galor and Moav (2002)
show that individual preferences for offspring quality play a role in population growth
and human capital formation.8 Benabou et al. (2015, 2016) show that innovation can
be negatively associated with people’s religiosity. From an empirical viewpoint, Tabellini
(2010) shows that cultural propensities such as trust have a significant effect on regional
per-capita income in Europe. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) examine the effects of family
ties on economic performance. In a more growth-theoretic approach, Chu (2007) provides
the interesting argument that entrepreneurial overconfidence can cause different rates of
economic growth across countries. Moreover, Chu and Cozzi (2011) investigate the effects
of cultural preferences for fertility on economic growth. As Yano (2009) points out, the
coordination of such cultural factors with laws and rules is indispensable to deriving high
quality markets and thereby healthy economic growth. The present study extends this
literature by investigating a composition effect of receptivity to novelty, patent protection,
and population on long-run economic growth. In a broader perspective, our study also
relates to the literature on a unified growth theory that is “designed to capture the
complexity of the process of growth and development over the entire course of human
history” (Galor 2005).
Second, our paper contributes to the literature about innovation and growth cycles
by showing the possibility of perpetually cyclical innovation. Specifically, we follow the
literature when we assume that the patent length in a discrete time model is just one
period (Shleifer 1986, Deneckere and Judd 1992, Gale 1996, Francois and Shi 1999, Mat-
suyama 1999, 2001, Yano and Furukawa 2013, Furukawa 2015). In the existing models,
the role of receptivity or openness to novelty is not considered; at the same time, our
model clearly distinguishes between developing new goods (that is, invention) and sav-
ing them from obsolescence (that is, introduction), both of which are costly investment
activities. We contribute to this literature by showing the existence of a new innovation
cycle over which invention and introduction alternate along an equilibrium path. This
finding is consistent with some historical facts indicating that these two phenomena often
take place at different times (e.g., Mokyr 2000).9
Third, as previously mentioned, there are two different creative activities, namely
invention and introduction, in our model. In this sense, our paper is also related to
the literature on two-stage innovation models, which distinguishes basic and applied
research (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt 1996, Michelacci 2003, Akiyama 2009, Cozzi and
Galli 2009, 2013, 2014, Acs and Sanders 2012, Chu et al. 2012, Chu and Furukawa 2013,
Konishi 2015). Our study complements these other studies by distinguishing two different
processes of applied research, i.e., the invention of a new product and its introduction.
8Subsequent studies by Ashraf and Galor (2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2017) explore cultural/genetic diversity
and regional development at different stages and in different places.
9Our result is also consistent with the basic understanding in evolutionary biology that when evolu-
tionary systems are overly open to novel things, the result will be chaos (Kauffman 1995).
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3 The Relationship between Receptivity to Novelty
and Innovation: Cross-country Evidence
In Figure 1 in the Introduction, we observed an unconditional, hump-shaped relationship
between receptivity and innovation. To statistically verify it, this section presents a more
formal regression analysis. We use data from the WVS to measure receptivity in different
countries in terms of whether they consider new ideas are better than old ones and data
on patent applications by residents from the World Intellectual Property Organization to
measure innovation.10
We estimate the following quadratic regression to identify whether, after controlling
for several country-level characteristics, there is still a non-linear relationship between
receptivity and innovation:
Innovationc = α + β1Receptivityc + β2(Receptivityc)
2 + δXc + εc. (1)
In this regression, c indexes a country, Innovationc and Receptivityc are the innovation
and receptivity measures. Xc is a vector of other country-level control variables, including
log GDP per capita, log Population, intellectual property protection, years of tertiary
schooling, net inflow of foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP, religiosity;
these control variables are also used in Benabou et al. (2016). Finally, εc is the error
term.
Table 1 shows the regression results of (1). In Column (1), we regress Innovationc
on Receptivityc and its square term only. The coefficient of Receptivity is positive and
that of the square term is negative; both coefficients are statistically significant, sug-
gesting that, unconditionally, there is a non-linear (inverted-U) relationship between the
two variables. In Column (2), we control for the country-level characteristics except the
religiosity variables in the regression. Finally, Benabou et al. (2016) find that innovation
is negatively related people’s religiosity; in Columns (3) and (4), we further control for
the share of religious people and the share of people believing in God. In these other
regressions, we still obtain similar results. Besides, the signs of the coefficients of these
control variables are in general consistent with those reported in Benabou et al. (2016).
Overall, this analysis shows that, after controlling for some country-level characteristics,
we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between Innovationc and Receptivityc. The
regression results imply that Innovationc reaches the maximum when Receptivityc is
roughly around 4.2 to 4.6. Certainly, the results reported in Table 1 only imply associa-
tions rather than causality. Nevertheless, these results provide the motivation for us to
study the model developed in the remaining parts of the paper.
4 An Innovation-based Growth Model with Consumer
Receptivity
4.1 Consumption and Receptivity
Time is discrete and extends from 0 to ∞. We think of a dynamic general equilibrium
model with an infinitely lived representative consumer, who inelastically supplies L units
10Data Appendix contains further details about the data sources and definitions of the variables used
in the Section.
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Table 1: Receptivity and innovation: Regression analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Receptivityc 12.773** 11.661* 14.341*** 11.748**
(6.169) (6.744) (5.276) (5.344)
(Receptivityc)
2 -1.400** -1.389** -1.554*** -1.310**
(0.614) (0.643) (0.522) (0.522)
GDP per capita (log) 0.547* 0.526** 0.509**
(0.286) (0.227) (0.249)
Population (log) 0.098 0.242** 0.219*
(0.154) (0.121) (0.125)
Index of patent rights 0.889*** 0.596** 0.522**
(0.320) (0.251) (0.213)
Years of tertiary schooling -0.014 0.001 0.005
(0.028) (0.018) (0.018)
FDI (as % of GDP) -0.018 -0.085 0.195
(0.280) (0.246) (0.269)
% religious people -4.049***
(0.893)
% people believing in God -5.716***
(1.723)
Constant -24.545 -25.298 -32.151*** -23.054*
(15.353) (17.097) (12.327) (12.310)
Observations 50 29 29 27
R2 0.279 0.769 0.853 0.872
Note: The dependent variable is Patent applications per million capita
(log). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗: signifi-
cance at 10% level; ∗∗: significance at 5% level; ∗ ∗ ∗: significance at
1% level.
of labor in each period. The infinitely lived consumer solves the standard dynamic opti-
mization of consumption and saving:
maxU =
∞∑
t=0
βt lnu(t), (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the time preference rate and u(t) is an index of consumption in period
t. As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), periodic utility u is defined over differentiated
consumption goods, with each indexed by j. We assume a constant elasticity of substitu-
tion utility function as:
u(t) =
(∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
(ε(j, t) x(j, t))
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1
, (3)
where x(j, t) denotes the consumption of good j in period t and σ ≥ 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between any two consumption goods. The consumption goods are catego-
rized into two types: new goods and old goods. Let N(t) be the set of new goods invented
in period t and A(t) be the set of old goods. An old good is a fundamental good that
is fully introduced and takes root in the economy, so that it does not become obsolete.
For simplicity of the description, let A(t) or N(t) also denote the number (measure) of
goods.
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A new good is a newly invented design of a good, which is “fragile” in the following
sense. Unlike an old good, a new good may be only transient and, thus, become obsolete
after being consumed for one period. Consumers differentiate new and old goods because
they are endowed with not only a love of variety, but also a love of novelty, so to speak.
We incorporate such references to novelty into the model, by means of a weight function,
ε(j, t), which is specified as
ε(j, t) =
{
1 if j ∈ A(t) (old goods)
ε if j ∈ N(t) (new goods) . (4)
In (4), the old goods are weighted with ε(j, t) = 1 (normalization), while the new goods
are weighted with ε(j, t) = ε ≥ 0.11 We interpret the weight of new goods ε as a measure
of how open consumers are to newly invented products. We refer to ε as consumer
receptivity to novelty. If consumers have no receptivity to novelty whatsoever (or, a
complete aversion to novelty), it holds that ε = 0, in which case they do not exhibit
any preference with regard to new goods. Consumers with receptivity to novelty (i.e.,
with ε > 0) will feel some utility for new goods. If we borrow from a technical term
in psychology, we may interpret this preference parameter ε as capturing a consumer’s
degree of “novelty seeking,” which is a widely accepted concept in various fields. Novelty
seeking is commonly defined as a human personality trait associated with “exhilaration
or excitement in response to novel stimuli” (Cloninger 1986). Since consumers in different
cultures can have different degrees of novelty seeking on average (Chandrasekaran and
Tellis 2008, Tellis et al. 2009), we may consider ε as an intrinsic parameter on the
preference that historically and culturally characterizes a society.12
Each good j, a new or old good, is dominated by a monopolistic producer. We consider
a one-for-one technology in goods production. Namely, any producer, j ∈ A(t) or N(t),
hires x(j, t) units of labor to produce x(j, t) units of good j, and monopolistically sells
them to the consumer.
4.2 Innovation through Invention and Introduction
We extend the endogenous process of innovation a` la Romer (1990) by considering that
a newly invented good will become obsolete or survive to be introduced into the society
as an old good; in this process, both invention and introduction are endogenous activities
that require time and resources.
A potentially infinite number of firms can be involved in the innovation process. Any
firm can invent a new good in period t + 1 by making an investment of 1/A(t) units of
labor in period t. Following Romer (1990), we consider “external effects arising from
knowledge spillovers” of cumulative technologies, represented by A(t).13
An old good is, in contrast, an introduced good that takes root in the society and
is never obsolete, from which an economy will permanently have utility. In our view,
transforming a new good into such a well-established good is concerned with compelling
11One may think it is more natural to assume ε < 1. In some cases, however, people can show an
unusually strong affinity for new goods (relative to old goods), so we allow for ε to be higher than 1
although it does not change our results essentially.
12The view that the degree of novelty seeking, or receptivity to novelty, varies has also been considered
in consumer research (Hirschman 1980) and business (Rogers 1962, Rogers and Shoemaker 1971).
13We suppose that there is no spillover from newly invented goods, since they are so new that their
information would not be diffused well. Nevertheless, even if we allow for new goods N(t) in public
knowledge, the main results will not qualitatively change.
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consumers to be knowledgeable of and fully accept it. Investment in introduction, thus,
covers various activities, including marketing, advertising, and lobbying, as well as some
technical improvements.
Analogous to invention firms, a potentially infinite number of firms can be engaged in
introduction activities. A firm, first, invests one unit of labor to search through the set
of new goods, N(t), in period t; then, it can find χ(t) units of new goods from N(t), and
introduce this these new goods into the society in period t+1, thus, earning monopolistic
profits. In this process, new goods are transformed into old goods. We consider a linear
technology, χ(t) ≡ κN(t), in which κ > 0 is a productivity parameter.14 With this
function, we naturally assume that firms can find more new goods when there are more
new goods in the economy. When introduction happens, we say that the economy brings
about innovation, by which we mean the entire process in which new goods are invented
and, then, introduced to take root in society (as old goods).
The law of motion governing the growth of old goods, A(t), is given by
A(t+ 1)− A(t) = χ(t)RA(t) ≤ N(t), (5)
in which RA(t) denotes the number of firms that invest in introduction activities in
period t. None of old goods becomes obsolete since they fully take root in the economy.15
Meanwhile, we assume that the new goods that are not introduced become obsolete. We,
thus, express the evolution of N(t) as:
N(t+ 1) = RN(t), (6)
where RN(t) denotes the number of firms that invest in invention activities in period t.
Here, a macroeconomic rate at which new goods are accepted as old goods in society
from period t to t+ 1 is equal to
χ(t)RA(t)/N(t) ≡ ρ(t+ 1). (7)
Unlike consumer receptivity ε as a preference parameter, one may interpret ρ(t + 1) as
an equilibrium rate of receptivity at the aggregate level.
4.3 Market Equilibrium
The infinitely lived consumer solves static optimization in (2); as is well known, we have
the demand functions:
x(j, t) = ε(j, t)σ−1
E(t)p(j, t)−σ
P (t)1−σ
, (8)
where E(t) ≡ ∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t) p(j, t)x(j, t)dj is the spending on differentiated goods, p(j, t)
denotes the price of good j in period t, and P (t) is the usual price index, defined as:
P (t) ≡
(∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
(p(j, t)/ε(j, t))1−σdj
) 1
1−σ
. (9)
14From a broader perspective, this κ can relate to firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal
1989).
15We could allow for some small depreciation for A(t), without rendering any essential change to the
result.
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Solving dynamic optimization, we also obtain the Euler equation:
E(t+ 1)
E(t)
= β(1 + r(t)), (10)
where r(t) stands for the interest rate.
We assume that producing one unit of goods requires one unit of labor and, thus, the
marginal cost is equal to the wage rate, w(t). By (8), the consumption good producers,
j ∈ A(t) ∪ N(t), face a constant price elasticity of market demand, equal to σ ≥ 1.
The unconstrained mark-up for a monopolistic producer is σ/(σ − 1) > 1. To allow for a
Cobb-Douglas case with σ = 1, we follow Li (2001), Goh and Olivier (2002), and Iwaisako
and Futagami (2013) and introduce an upper bound of the mark-up—say, µ > 1—by
considering potential imitators whose production cost increases with so-called patent
breadth.16 The breadth of a patent is identified with “the flow rate of profit available to
the patentee” and often interpreted as “the ability of the patentee to raise price” (Gilbert
and Shapiro 1990). Following the literature, we regard µ as the breadth of a patent and
assume µ < σ/(σ − 1).17 Each firm, thus, sets a monopolistic price at:
p(j, t) = µw(t) (11)
for all j. Using (4), (8), and (11), the output and monopolistic profit for a new good are
given by:
x(j, t) =
εσ−1E(t)
P (t)1−σ
(µw(t))−σ ≡ xn(t) for j ∈ N(t) (12)
and
pi(j, t) = εσ−1
µ− 1
µσ
E(t)
(
w(t)
P (t)
)1−σ
≡ pin(t) for j ∈ N(t). (13)
Equation (13) shows that when σ > 1, the profit for a new good, pin(t), increases with
consumer receptivity, ε, and the total expenditure, E(t), and decreases with the real
wage, w(t)/P (t).18
We follow Shleifer (1986), Deneckere and Judd (1992), Gale (1996), Francois and Shi
(1999), Matsuyama (1999, 2001), and Furukawa (2015) by assuming that the monopolistic
firm earns a profit only for one period. The one-period monopoly has also been used in a
different context (e.g., in the field of directed technical change and the environment) (see
Acemoglu et al. 2012). Therefore, the firm inventing good j enjoys only a one-period
monopoly. The discounted present value of creating a new good can be written as:
W n(t) ≡ pi
n(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
− w(t)
A(t)
. (14)
We also follow Acemoglu et al. (2012) by assuming that, after one period, monopoly
rights will, then, be allocated randomly to a firm drawn from the pool of potential mo-
nopolistic firms. Consequently, in our model, goods are all monopolistically competitively
produced in equilibrium. Alternatively, we could also proceed in such a way that goods
with expired patents are sold at a perfectly competitive price (e.g., Matsuyama 1999)
or become obsolete (e.g., Furukawa 2015). However, we understand that either option
16See, for example, Chu et al. (2016) for a more recent examination.
17The upper bound of a mark-up, µ, can also be seen as a result of price regulation (Evans et al. 2003).
18We will also see the case of σ = 1.
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will complicate the analysis without garnering any new insights. Although it could be
an interesting extension, we keep the analysis as simple as possible to highlight the main
issue discussed in the Introduction.
Analogous to the case of a new good, j ∈ N(t), by (4), (8), and (11), the output and
monopolistic profit for an old good are given by:
x(j, t) =
E(t)
P (t)1−σ
(µw(t))−σ ≡ xa(t) for j ∈ A(t) (15)
and
pi(j, t) =
µ− 1
µσ
E(t)
(
w(t)
P (t)
)1−σ
≡ pia(t) for j ∈ A(t), (16)
respectively. The profit associated with an old good increases with the expenditure, E(t),
and decreases with the real wage, w(t)/P (t). Given the one-period patent protection, the
discounted present value of introducing an old good is expressed as
W a(t) ≡ (κN(t))pi
a(t+ 1)
1 + r(t)
− w(t). (17)
As shown in (13) and (16), the real wage w(t)/P (t) is an important component of the
profits. It is, thus, beneficial to have
w(t)
P (t)
=
1
µ
[
A(t) + εσ−1N(t)
] 1
σ−1 , (18)
which uses p(j, t) = µw(t) for any j ∈ A(t) ∪N(t) with (9).
Under the free entry of firms into innovation, the present value of their payoff must
be equal to or less than 0:
W n(t) ≤ 0 and W a(t) ≤ 0, (19)
for any t ≥ 0. The labor market clearing condition is:
L =
∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj︸ ︷︷ ︸
production
+ RA(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
introduction
+
RN(t)
A(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
invention
, (20)
where χ(t)RA(t)/N(t) ≡ ρ(t + 1). Using (12), (15), (18), and (20),19 the labor demand
from the production sector is calculated as∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj =
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
. (21)
19Noting (12) and (15), with (18), we have∫
j∈A(t)∪N(t)
x(j, t)dj = N(t)xn(t) +A(t)xa(t) =
1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
.
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5 Equilibrium Dynamics
We are now ready to derive the dynamical system that characterizes the law of motion
that determines the equilibrium trajectory of the economy. In doing this, it is beneficial
to define n(t) ≡ N(t)/A(t), which is the ratio of new to old goods. The equilibrium
dynamics can be completely characterized by means of this knowledge ratio. By the free
entry conditions in (19), along with (13), (14), (16), and (17), we derive the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Only the invention of a new good takes place in equilibrium when n(t) <
εσ−1/κ. Only the introduction of a new good takes place when n(t) > εσ−1/κ.
The cut-off level of n(t), εσ−1/κ, generates two equilibrium regimes in the economy.
The first corresponds to n(t) ∈ (0, εσ−1/κ), which we call an invention regime; there,
only invention takes place. The second corresponds to n(t) ∈ (εσ−1/κ,∞), which we
call an introduction regime; there, only introduction takes place. At the cut-off point,
the economy includes both activities; however, we can ignore it, since the point has zero
measure.
As shown in Lemma 1, a kind of specialization takes place in the present model. In
reality, any economy appears to be engaged in both invention and introduction, more
or less, at any point in time. Therefore, this model captures only a certain aspect of
real-world behavior—that is, the economy invests in either invention or introduction. We
can easily remove this unrealistic aspect concerning specialization from the model by
assuming, for instance, a strictly concave function in invention and introduction. As this
would provide a deeper analysis but make the analysis intractable, we adopt the present
setting for simplicity, given that it is among the first to address the relationship between
receptivity to novelty and innovation.
As discussed in the Introduction, there are two interactive forces determining the role
of consumer receptivity to novelty ε in innovation, that is, the market mechanism and
the matching effect. Lemma 1 reveals the first force, by showing that for any given n(t),
an economy is engaged in invention activity in equilibrium if (and only if) the invention
regime, (0, εσ−1/κ) is sufficiently large. Since the consumer’s desire for new goods, relative
to old goods, becomes stronger as ε increases, and since the cost for introduction becomes
higher as κ decreases, there is a higher relative profit for the invention of a new good when
the individual receptivity to novelty ε is high and/or the productivity for introduction κ
is low. Consequently, the economy is more likely to specialize in invention activity for new
goods, because the development of technologies that earn a higher profit is encouraged in
market equilibrium. For the same reason, an economy is engaged in introduction activity
in market equilibrium for sufficiently low εσ−1/κ, in which case there is a higher relative
profit for the introduction of a new good. In sum, through the market mechanism, the
economy develops new technologies to produce the goods that the consumer relatively
prefers, whereby the receptivity to novelty ε plays a role in strengthening invention, rather
than introduction.
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Figure 2: Temporary Equilibrium in the Invention Regime
5.1 Invention Regime
With n(t) < εσ−1/κ, by Lemma 1, the economy falls into the invention regime. With
(10), (14), (13), and (18), the free entry condition for invention, W n(t) = 0, becomes:
N(t+ 1) =
A(t)
εσ−1
[
βεσ−1
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− 1
]
, (22)
which uses A(t + 1) = A(t) (or ρ(t + 1) = 0). Given A(t), this describes a profit-
motive aspect of the inventive activity; the larger the discounted profit from selling new
goods ((βεσ−1(µ − 1)/µ)E(t)/w(t)), the greater the incentives for firms to invent a new
good. The profit for a new good increases as the wage-adjusted expenditure E(t)/w(t)
increases and, at the same time, as the consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε increases.
With a larger stock of public knowledge, the cost of inventing a new good decreases and
firms have greater incentives for invention. Meanwhile, when n(t) < εσ−1/κ, no firm has
any incentive to invest in introducing a new good; in such a case, RA(t) = 0. The labor
market condition (20), thus, becomes:
N(t+ 1) = A(t)
[
L− 1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
]
, (23)
which uses (6) and (21). GivenA(t), the greater the wage-adjusted expenditure E(t)/w(t),
the more resources will be devoted to production, leaving less for invention; this will result
in a smaller N(t+ 1).
Figure 2 depicts (22) and (23), labeled with FE and LE, respectively, which deter-
mine the equilibrium number of new goods, N(t+1), and the wage-adjusted expenditure,
E(t)/w(t), as a unique intersection. Looking at this figure, we can see that some stan-
dard properties hold in the present model. Given the predetermined variable, A(t), the
equilibrium number of new goods N(t+1) is increasing in the time preference rate β, the
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labor force L, and the patent breadth µ. Given these parameters, the invented goods,
N(t+ 1), is increasing in public knowledge stock A(t).
The effect of the elasticity of substitution between goods, σ, is more interesting. As
is standard, σ determines the expenditure share spent on each good. If new goods are
preferable to old goods (ε > 1), a higher elasticity of substitution would lead to a higher
expenditure share for the new good, resulting in an upward shift of the FE curve in
Figure 2. If old goods are preferable (ε < 1), there would be a lower expenditure share
for the new good, resulting in a downward shift of the FE curve. When σ = 1 (i.e., the
case of a Cobb–Douglas preference), any expenditure share is always constant and free
from receptivity to novelty ε. As a result, the new good N(t+1) is increasing (decreasing)
in the elasticity of substitution σ in an economy with a strong (weak) preference for the
new good ε > 1 (ε < 1).
As for the receptivity to novelty ε, a higher ε causes an upward shift in the FE curve.
This is simply because the equilibrium profit for new goods, (βεσ−1(µ−1)/µ)E(t)/w(t), is
higher.20 The upward shift of the FE curve leads to an increase in N(t+1) in equilibrium.
We can formally confirm this effect of ε by solving (22) and (23):
N(t+ 1) = ΘA(t), (24)
where
Θ ≡ ε
σ−1(µ− 1)L− 1/β
εσ−1 ((µ− 1) + 1/β) . (25)
Equation (24) determines the equilibrium amount of new goods in the invention regime.
The coefficient Θ is increasing in the receptivity to novelty ε as well as the standard
parameters β, L, and µ. We can interpret the parameter composite Θ as the potential
demand for new goods. We assume Θ > 0 to allow for positive growth, by imposing
εσ−1β(µ − 1)L > 1, which provides a lower bound of ε as [1/(β(µ − 1)L)]1/(σ−1) ≡ ε0.
Meanwhile, since RA(t) = 0 and thus ρ(t + 1) = 0 in the invention regime, from (5),
the old goods do not grow; A(t + 1) = A(t). Therefore, if Θ > εσ−1/κ, it holds that
n(t + 1) > εσ−1/κ, whereby the economy moves to the introduction regime in period
t+ 1. Conversely, if Θ < εσ−1/κ, the economy is trapped to stay in the invention regime.
We may refer to this situation as an invention trap, since there is neither innovation nor
growth in the long run (as will be apparent later). While this economy invents new goods
every period, both N(t) and A(t) are ever constant in the invention trap. The following
lemma summarizes this feature:
Lemma 2 The economy is permanently trapped in the invention regime if and only if
Θ < εσ−1/κ.
Inspection of (24) and (25) reveals the second force determining the role of consumer
receptivity ε, that is, the matching effect. From (24), the equilibrium amount of new
goods is larger as the invention potential Θ is larger and the old goods A(t) are larger.
Given that stronger preferences for new goods increase their potential demand (i.e., Θ
increases with ε), the consumer receptivity to novelty ε is conducive to inventions. That
is, higher ε yields more new goods to be invented in the marketplace, which essentially
increases the efficiency of matching for firms. Firms can find more new goods that
they will introduce in the subsequent period. As a result, it encourages aggregate-level
innovation in our model.
20See also (13).
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5.2 Introduction Regime
With n(t) > εσ−1/κ, by Lemma 1, the economy is in the introduction regime in period t;
RA(t) ≥ 0 and RN(t) = 0. Rearranging the labor market condition (20), with (21), yields
the economy’s equilibrium rate of receptivity as:
ρ(t+ 1) = κRA(t) = κ
(
L− 1
µ
E(t)
w(t)
)
. (26)
Analogous to (23), (26) captures the trade-off on resources between the production of
goods and the investment in introduction. With (10), (16), and (17), the free entry
condition for introduction, W a(t) = 0, becomes:
ρ(t+ 1) =
κβ
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− A(t)
N(t)
(27)
which uses N(t+1) = RN(t) = 0 from (6), with χ(t)RA(t) = ρ(t+1)N(t), and A(t+1) =
A(t)+χ(t)RA(t) = A(t)+χ(t)ρ(t+1)/κ from (5). Naturally, the equilibrium rate ρ(t+1)
of receptivity at the aggregate level increases with the discounted profit from producing
the old good (β(µ − 1)/µ)E(t)/w(t). In addition, ρ(t + 1) decreases with the number
of old goods A(t), since the profit is lower when the economy has sufficient old goods
(due to diminishing marginal utility in (3)). It increases with the number of new goods
N(t), since firms can find more inventions. Figure 3 illustrates how the equilibrium rate
of receptivity ρ(t+ 1) is determined by (26) and (27). Solving (26) and (27), we obtain:21
ρ(t+ 1) =
1
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
κβ (µ− 1)L− A(t)
N(t)
)
. (28)
The equilibrium rate of receptivity, ρ(t+ 1), is positively (negatively) correlated with
new good N(t) (the old good A(t)), through the free entry condition (27). Using (5) and
(28), the growth of old goods follows
A(t+ 1) = A(t)
β (µ− 1)
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
1 + κL
N(t)
A(t)
)
(29)
In the present regime, the new goods do not grow; N(t + 1) = 0 from (6). This implies
n(t+ 1) = 0, which is clearly lower than εσ−1/κ. We therefore have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The introduction regime is unstable; the economy in the introduction regime
necessarily shifts to the invention regime.
6 Invention Traps and Innovation Cycles
In this section, we will demonstrate our main result. An economy with too strong or too
weak receptivity to novelty is caught in an underdevelopment trap in which new goods
are constantly invented but any of them is introduced as old goods; there is no innovation.
Only with moderate receptivity can the economy achieve perpetual innovation.
21Note that ρ(t + 1) > 0 always holds, with the positive growth assumption, εσ−1β(µ − 1)L > 1. In
order to retain feasibility, we have to ensure that ρ(t + 1) < 1, or equivalently χ(t)RA(t) ≤ N(t), holds
entirely in the introduction regime. We do this by imposing κL < 1 + 1/(β (µ− 1)).
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Figure 3: Temporary Equilibrium in the Introduction Regime
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6.1 A Benchmark
Before proceeding, we, first, present a special case with a unit elasticity of substitution
between goods. With σ = 1, the condition in Lemma 2 becomes:
β(µ− 1)L− 1
β (µ− 1) + 1 <
1
κ
. (30)
Independent of the consumer receptivity ε, this inequality always holds, due to the fea-
sibility condition (see footnote 21). This case, therefore, provides us with a convenient
benchmark from which we depart in identifying the role of the consumer’s preference for
new inventions, ε, in innovation and growth.
By Lemmata 2 and 3, the benchmark economy is necessarily caught in the trap; any
path starting from any initial point, in either regime, eventually stays in the invention
regime. As we have already seen, such an economy invents new goods every period, but
any of them become simply obsolete, not transformed into old goods. The consumer’s
receptivity to novelty ε plays no role; this is because, in the present case, the preference
parameter ε does not affect demands and profits, as σ = 1 (i.e., the expenditure share of
the consumer for new goods, to old goods, is constant with the Cobb–Douglas preference).
Remark 1 The consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε has no role in equilibrium if the con-
sumption goods are independent goods (i.e., σ = 1). In this benchmark case, independent
of ε, the economy is fatally caught in the equilibrium trap, in which there is no innovation
in the long run.
Remark 1 implies that without a role of receptivity ε, our economy cannot achieve
innovation and growth in the long run. In what follows, we will relax the knife-edge
assumption σ = 1 to demonstrate the possibility of receptivity-driven innovation and
derive a condition under which it actually occurs in equilibrium.
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6.2 The Role of Receptivity in Innovation
In this section, we depart from the benchmark to characterize the essential role of recep-
tivity ε in innovation, by assuming substitutability, that is, σ > 1. First, let us consider
the case where Θ < εσ−1/κ. In other words, the economy’s inventive potential Θ is rel-
atively low and, at the same time, the consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is relatively
high. On the one hand, the invention regime is larger due to a high ε. On the other
hand, the invention flow N(t) within the regime tends to be low, due to a low Θ. As
shown in Lemma 2, the economy behaves as if in the benchmark case, fatally caught in
an equilibrium trap with no innovation.
Given that the invention potential Θ is an increasing function in ε, there will be a
mixed role of ε, under the assumption of σ > 1. If the receptivity to novelty ε is high,
on the one hand, the consumer will prefer new goods to old goods. With this effect, the
invention of new goods becomes more profitable than does the introduction of new goods,
as old ones, and, thus, the invention regime (0, εσ−1/κ) will become large, through the
market mechanism. This will make the economy more likely to get caught in what we call
the invention trap. On the other hand, a higher ε results in a higher Θ. This means that
the potential demand for new goods Θ is large. This increase in Θ is accompanied by an
increase in the equilibrium number of new goods N(t). Firms can meet more new goods
that are available for introduction. With this effect of ε through the matching effect,
the left-hand side of Θ < εσ−1/κ increases, and the economy is less likely to be trapped.
These two opposite effects interact to create an ambiguous role for the receptivity to
novelty ε. To see which effect dominates, we present the following lemma, recalling the
lower bound of ε, ε > ε0 ≡ [1/(β(µ− 1)L)]1/(σ−1) .
Lemma 4 If
L < 2
√
1
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
1
β (µ− 1) ≡ L0, (31)
Θ < εσ−1/κ holds for any ε > ε0. Otherwise, there exists ε+ ≥ ε− > ε0, such that
Θ < εσ−1/κ holds if (and only if) ε 6∈ [ε−, ε+].
Proof. Rewriting Θ < εσ−1/κ, we obtain
F (εσ−1) ≡ 1
κ
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)(
εσ−1
)2 − Lεσ−1 + 1
β (µ− 1) > 0, (32)
which is a second-order polynomial inequality in terms of εσ−1. Since the leading coeffi-
cient is positive, this inequality is always true if the discriminant is negative; that is to
say:
D := L2 − 4/κ
β (µ− 1)
(
1 +
1
β (µ− 1)
)
< 0,
which is equivalent to (31). For D ≥ 0, let
εσ−1− =
L−√D
(2/κ)(1 + 1/(β(σ − 1))) , ε
µ−1
+ =
L+
√
D
(2/κ)(1 + 1/(β(µ− 1))) . (33)
For any εσ−1 between εσ−1− and ε
σ−1
+ or at one of them, the left-hand side of (32),
that is, F (εσ−1), is nonpositive, and otherwise it is positive. Finally, to show ε− >
ε0, let us suppose ε
σ−1
0 ≥ εσ−1− ; then, εσ−10 > εσ−1+ must hold, because F (εσ−10 ) =
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(β(µ − 1)/κ) (1 + 1/(β(µ− 1))) (1/(βL(µ− 1)))2 is strictly positive.22 Taking, for in-
stance, εσ−1 = εσ−11 ≡ 2/(βL(µ − 1)) > εσ−10 , F (εσ−11 ) > 0 must also hold, since
εσ−11 > ε
σ−1
0 > ε
σ−1
+ . However, by substituting ε
σ−1 = εσ−11 into (32), we verify that
F (εσ−11 ) > 0 can hold only for D < 0, which contradicts D ≥ 0.
Lemma 4 implies that the economy will become fatally trapped in the invention regime
if the country size, L, is too small; this clarifies an essential role of the so-called scale effect
within the model. While the existence of the scale effect has been empirically rejected
from a long-run perspective, by using 100 years of data (Jones 1995), it might play a role
in world development in the very long run, such as in terms of millennia (Boserup 1965,
Kremer 1993). Consistent with this view, Lemma 4 shows that population size affects
innovation and growth in the long run. The threshold level of L in (31), L0, comprises
several parameters. Since, for instance, L0 decreases with κ, the productivity of firms has
a role in avoiding traps, which is natural and intuitive. In the remainder of this paper,
to focus on receptivity ε, we restrict our analyses to the case with L ≥ L0.
Another important implication of Lemma 4 is that only an economy with moderate
receptivity to novelty ε, such as ε ∈ [ε−, ε+], can avoid falling into traps. In other words,
if consumers’ preferences for new goods are too strong or weak, the economy can be
caught in an invention trap. That is, ε /∈ [ε−, ε+] is the trap condition. This nonlinear
effect comes from the interaction between the two opposite roles of ε. When the consumer
hardly appreciates new goods, and there is, therefore, a very low ε, the potential demand
for new goods Θ is also too small for firms to find an enough amount of new goods,
χ(t)N(t). When the consumer very much appreciates new goods, with a very high ε,
the investment in invention is very profitable, making the threshold εσ−1/κ much higher.
With this high εσ−1/κ, the economy can scarcely emerge from such a large invention
regime. These two forces interact with each other to create the nonlinear effect of ε.
Proposition 1 (Extreme Receptivity Causes Innovation to Fail Eventually)
When the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is sufficiently low or high,
such that ε /∈ [ε−, ε+], there is a globally stable equilibrium trap, n∗. The economy neces-
sarily converges to the situation in which invention occurs, but there is no innovation in
the long run.
Proof. It is straightforward from Lemmata 1–4.
Proposition 1 implies that not only the “fear of novelty” (Beveridge 1959, Barber
1961), but also love of novelty may cause an economy to fall into a no-innovation trap.
Together with Remark 1, this critical effect of consumer receptivity to novelty ε appears
only when consumption goods are gross substitutes. Intuitively, given that new and
old goods are substitutes (σ > 1), a consumer with a weak preference for new goods
(low ε) and who suffers from a fear of novelty will have a small demand for new goods,
which are the origins of old goods. This effect discourages the efficiency of matching for
introduction, causing the economy to be more likely to be caught in the invention regime.
Meanwhile, there is another relative effect of low ε, where inventing a new good becomes
less profitable than does introducing new goods; such circumstances would shrink the
invention regime itself (i.e., a lower threshold εσ−1/κ). This causes the economy to be
less likely to be caught in the invention regime. As shown in Proposition 1, these two
22Potentially, because of F (ε0) > 0, either min{ε−, ε+} > ε0 or max{ε−, ε+} < ε0 necessarily holds,
given that the leading coefficient of F (εσ−1) is positive.
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opposite effects—each emerging with the market mechanism and the matching effect—
interact with each other to generate the nonlinear effect of the receptivity to novelty ε.
On the one hand, if preferences for new goods ε are sufficiently weak, our result shows
that the former absolute effect dominates—that is, the invention of new goods (N(t))
is too slow to exceed the threshold, εσ−1/κ. On the other hand, if a consumer has a
strong preference for new goods (high ε), with a love of novelty, the latter relative effect
dominates. The invention N(t) is rapid due to the former effect, but the invention regime,
(0, εσ−1/κ), is large due to the latter effect. As in the case of a small ε, therefore, the
economy tends to be trapped in the invention regime. Consequently, both too much fear
and too much love of novelty can generate a stable underdevelopment trap in equilibrium.
What if the receptivity to novelty ε were moderate, such that Θ > εσ−1/κ holds? In
this case, any equilibrium path achieves self-sustained innovation perpetually. By Lemma
2, an economy that falls in the invention regime in some period, say t, will go out of it
to the introduction regime in the subsequent period, t + 1. By Lemma 3, any economy
in the introduction regime necessarily moves to the invention regime. Any path starting
from anywhere (in either regime) perpetually fluctuates, moving back and forth between
the two regimes. We may interpret this equilibrium path as an innovation cycle, in the
sense that innovation takes place only in the introduction regime.
We summarize this finding as a proposition.
Proposition 2 (Moderate Receptivity Supports Perpetual Innovation) When
the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is moderate, such that ε ∈ [ε−, ε+],
the economy necessarily avoids traps and achieves perpetual innovation.
Proof. It is straightforward from Lemmata 1–4.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our innovation cycle is new to the literature
(Shleifer 1986), in the sense that, in our model, innovation covers the entire process
in which new goods are invented and, then, introduced to take root in the economy (as
old goods). Note that both invention and introduction are endogenous, time-consuming,
and costly activities. Our result contributes to the literature on innovation cycles by
showing the existence of a new innovation cycle over which invention and introduction
endogenously alternate along an equilibrium path. This cycle is consistent with some
historical facts argued in Mokyr (2000) and his related articles, indicating that inven-
tion and introduction typically take place at different times (e.g., steam engines and the
Internet).
In Propositions 1 and 2, we demonstrate that an economy with too much receptivity
or aversion to novelty becomes caught in an underdevelopment trap, where there is only
invention, and no innovation takes place. Only an economy with moderate receptivity
to novelty ε can achieve self-sustained innovation. We believe that these results can,
at least partially, explain the fact we document in Figure 1 and Table 1. It is that
individual receptivity to novelty is not always conducive to innovation; too strong or too
weak receptivity may hurt innovation at the aggregate level.
Finally, we verify that, in our model, innovation as the introduction of new goods
as old goods is the only engine of long-run growth. To proceed, we follow the stan-
dard definition of an “economic growth rate”: γ(t) ≡ (u(t + 1) − u(t))/u(t). By us-
ing (3), (12), (15), and (18), we obtain u(t) = u˜(t)A(t)
1
σ−1 , where u˜(t) = (E(t)/w(t))
(1 + εσ−1N(t)/A(t))
1
σ−1 includes the wage-measured expenditure, E(t)/w(t), and the frac-
tion of new goods, N(t)/A(t). When Θ < εσ−1/κ, the economy is caught in a trap. In a
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trapped economy, N(t) = ΘA(t), while both E(t)/w(t) and A(t) are constant over time.
The growth rate is, thus, equal to γ(t) = 0. This implies that while generating inventions,
any trapped economy cannot achieve self-sustained long-run growth. Using Proposition
2, therefore, we may conclude that having moderate receptivity to novelty ε is essential
to self-sustained growth as well as innovation.
7 An Extension: Balanced Growth and Path Depen-
dence
In this section, we explore an extension of our baseline model. Our model features only
traps and cycles in dynamic equilibrium. Therefore, we allow for the model to have
balanced growth.
For that purpose, we add minimal elements to the process of innovation. Following
Anderlini et al. (2013), we introduce an exogenous growth factor, η(t) ≥ 0, into the
baseline model;23 the number of endogenous inventions, RN(t), together with the number
of exogenously produced inventions, η(t), determine the dynamics of new goods by N(t+
1) = RN(t) + η(t). For the sake of simplicity, we further assume η(t) = ηN(t), with
η ∈ [0, 1).24 When W n(t) = 0, thus, the new good N(t) evolves in the invention regime
due to
N(t+ 1) = ΘA(t) + ηN(t), (34)
which corresponds to (24). When W a(t) = 0, the free entry condition similar to (27) is
now
ρ(t+ 1) =
κβ
µ/(µ− 1)
E(t)
w(t)
− A(t)
N(t)
− ηεσ−1, (35)
which uses N(t + 1) = ηN(t) since RN(t) = 0. From (26) and (35), the old good A(t)
evolves due to
ρ(t+ 1) =
1
1 + β (µ− 1)
(
β (µ− 1)κL− A(t)
N(t)
− ηεσ−1
)
.25 (36)
Combining (34) and (36), we can derive the equilibrium dynamical system as:
n(t+ 1) =
{
ηn(t) + Θ ≡ ϕN(n(t)) for n(t) < εσ−1/κ
η(1+β(µ−1))n(t)
β(µ−1)+(β(µ−1)κL−ηεσ−1)n(t) ≡ ϕA(n(t)) for n(t) > εσ−1/κ
, (37)
which uses (5).26 Function ϕN is linear and ϕA is concave, and both are increasing in
n(t), each of which has a unique fixed point for n(t) > 0, labelled n∗ and n∗∗, respectively.
23Exogenous innovation is often assumed in research for a deeper understanding of, not the cause of
innovation but, the role of innovation in various phenomena; see, for instance, Lucas and Moll (2014) and
Benhabib et al. (2017). Given that our goal in the present paper is to investigate the cause of innovation,
our extended model still has endogenous innovation, RN (t), more in accordance with Anderlini et al.
(2013), who consider both endogenous and exogenous components in the innovation process.
24If η > 1, the new good, N(t), autonomously expands without the help of endogenous invention.
Given the focus of our paper, we should restrict the exogenous growth factor to be lower than 1; η < 1.
25To ensure feasibility, such that ρ(t + 1) ∈ (0, 1) for any n(t) in the introduction regime, it would
suffice to assume β (µ− 1)κL− ((β (µ− 1) + κ/εσ−1 + 1) < ηεσ−1 < β (µ− 1)κL.
26We also use A(t+ 1) = A(t) for n(t) < εσ−1/κ and N(t+ 1) = ηN(t) for n(t) > εσ−1/κ. In order to
ensure n(t+1) > 0 for any n(t) > εσ−1/κ, we impose an upper bound of . ε < [(κ/η)β (µ− 1)L]1/(σ−1).
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Figure 4b: Global Trap with ߝ ב (ߝି, ߝା)
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Proposition 1 still holds, but locally; the conditions also change slightly. (A proof
requires a tedious sequence of similar calculations, which is omitted here.)27 Suppose
L >
√
1− η
κ
(
1 +
1
β(µ− 1)κ
)
1
β(µ− 1) ≡ L
′
0.
Then we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the extended model with the coexistence of endogenous and exogenous
inventions, if the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is sufficiently low
or high, such that ε /∈ [ε′−, ε′+],28 there is a locally stable equilibrium trap, n∗. Once the
economy falls into the invention regime, it is trapped and converging to the situation, n∗,
in which invention occurs, but there is no innovation in the long run.
Concerning the introduction regime, there are two possibilities. First, if n∗∗ exists
outside the introduction regime, the equilibrium behavior of the economy is quite similar
to that in Proposition 2. That is, the economy may achieve innovation perpetually but
cyclically, as shown in Figure 4a. Otherwise, it may be fatally caught in the global trap,
as shown in Figure 4b. Second, if n∗∗ is included in the introduction regime, it may work
as a globally stable steady state, as shown in Figure 4c. On that point, the number of new
goods, N(t), and that of old goods, A(t), grow at the same rate. Therefore, in this case,
any path starting from any initial state converges to point n∗∗ that gives the economy
balanced growth, as in the standard growth model. It is worth mentioning that in either
case, the economy achieves perpetual innovation and growth if ε ∈ [ε′−, ε′+], corresponding
to Figures 4a and 4c. Therefore, Proposition 2 will be revised in this extended model,
without any essential change.
27A formal proof is available upon request from the authors.
28Note that ε′− and ε
′
+ are solutions to the quadratic equation in ε, given by n
∗ = εσ−1/κ, with
n∗ = Θ/(1− η). They are quite similar to ε− and ε+ in Lemma 4.
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Figure 4c: Balanced Growth with ߝ א (ߝି, ߝା)
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Figure 5: Path Dependency with ߝ ב (ߝି, ߝା)
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Proposition 4 In the extended model with the coexistence of endogenous and exogenous
inventions, if the infinitely lived consumer’s receptivity to novelty ε is moderate, such that
ε ∈ [ε′−, ε′+], the economy necessarily avoids traps and achieves perpetual innovation. The
growth path is either cyclical or balanced.29
Figure 5 depicts another interesting case that emerges from the present extension.
There are two locally stable steady states; whether the economy converges to a balanced
growth path or invention trap depends on the initial condition. There is so-called path
dependence, implying that the economy may suffer from a lock-in by virtue of historical
events (e.g., Arthur 1989).
8 Concluding Remarks
In the present study, we investigated the relationship between individual receptivity to
novelty and innovation at the aggregate level. We first used data from the World Values
Survey and the World Intellectual Property Organization to show that the relationship
may be more complex than is naturally considered. We showed that, unconditionally,
innovation tends to be higher at the medium level of receptivity but lower at the two
ends of the receptivity distribution. To explain the mechanism through which receptivity
to novelty affects innovation in such a way, we developed a new innovation-based growth
model, in which the infinitely-lived representative consumer has different preferences to
new and old goods.
The endogenous growth literature has, thus far, emphasized the importance of endoge-
nous innovation as an engine of long-run growth (Romer 1990, Grossman and Helpman
1991, Aghion and Howitt 1992). The existing models were basically designed to identify
29It is easy (but tedious) to derive a condition under which the growth path is balanced. A formal
proof is available upon request from the authors.
22
the role of innovation through its ultimate contribution to the long-run growth rate, but
neither explicitly through its internal process of interacting with different stages in the
growth process nor its relation to the receptivity to novelty as a cultural preference. In the
model that we developed, invention and introduction are treated as discrete (and costly)
activities that interact with each other to achieve innovation and govern the evolution of
an economy. In our model, we clearly distinguished the invention of a new good from its
introduction, by introducing a new preference parameter; we also examined the role of
receptivity to novelty in creating self-sustained innovation and endogenous growth. The
model was designed to be simple and tractable, and, yet, capable of drawing new insights
into the role of innovation in economic growth and providing a theory consistent with the
new fact that we documented in the Introduction.
Needless to say, the present study offers only a glance at how receptivity to novelty
affects innovation-driven growth, when we earnestly delve into the details of the complex
process of innovation. Our proposed model does not contain all of the aspects of receptiv-
ity/aversion to novelty or innovation. It is, for example, considered exogenous, but it may
change over time, in line with consumer behavior. Although the formulation of matching
takes a very simple form, we could work with a more general setting, such as a Cobb-
Douglas matching function. These restrictions help make analysis sufficiently tractable,
but they also make the equilibrium unrealistic. Most importantly, in the present model,
there is no equilibrium where invention and introduction coexist; in reality, however, the
two components of innovation often take place concurrently. For future research, one can
rectify this problem by assuming strictly concave, rather than linear, technologies. Oth-
erwise, allowing for consumers’ learning activities with regard to novel products would
also work sufficiently. Nevertheless, given its simplicity, we believe that our model has an
advantage over such extended models: the equilibrium dynamic system is quite simple
and, therefore, all analyses can be undertaken analytically to demonstrate two interesting
dynamic phenomena, that is, equilibrium traps and innovation cycles.
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Data Appendix
This appendix provides further details about data sources and sample for the cross-
country analysis in Section 3.
Data sources We use data the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to
obtain patent applications for various countries. To measure receptivity, we use data from
the World Values Survey (WVS). In particular, we use the survey question E046 which
asks respondents to give a score to the statement “Ideas stood test of time better vs
New ideas better.” The score ranges from 1 (“Ideas that stood test of time are generally
best”) to 10 (“New ideas are generally better than old ones”).
We also use WVS to construct two measures of religiosity. Specifically, we use the
survey questions F034 and F050. F034 asks whether the respondent is a religious person
(the survey question is: “Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say
you are ...” with possible answers 1 (“A religious person”), 2 (“Not a religious person”),
and 3 (“A convinced atheist”).) F050 asks whether the respondent believes in god (the
survey question is: “Which, if any, of the following do you believe in? ... God” with
possible answers 0 (“No”) and 1 (“Yes”).)
As for other control variables, we obtain data for GDP and population from the World
Bank and data for the net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of
GDP from the World Development Index (WDI); the index of patent rights comes from
Park (2008); data for years of tertiary schooling come from Barro and Lee (2013); we
also use WVS data to construct the two religiosity measures (share of religious people
and share of people believing in God).
Variable definitions Using the patent applications data from WIPO and population
data from the World Bank, we compute the innovation variable as log (Average patent
applications over 2010-2014c/Average population in million over 2010-2014c).
To compute the receptivity measure, Receptivityc, we start with the full individual-
level sample from WVS (1981-2014). We drop observations with missing values in E046;
the resulting sample covers the period 1989-2002. We then collapse the sample into
country-level means to obtain Receptivityc.
Other control variables in the regression analysis are also country-level means. More
specifically, the index of patent rights is the average over 1960-1990; population, GDP
per capita, and FDI (as % of GDP) are the averages over 1960-1990; years of tertiary
schooling are the average over 1960-1990; the religiosity measures (share of religious
people and share of people believing in God) are the averages over 1981-2002.
The main reason of creating some “time lags” between the key outcome variable, the
key independent variable, and other control variables is to address some of the endogeneity
and reverse causality concerns.30
Sample characteristics Based on the above variable definitions, we obtain a sam-
ple with 52 observations (with non-missing Innovationc and Receptivityc), 29 (with
non-missing values in all other control variables). Note that there are two outliers in
Receptivityc (Bangladesh and Colombia): Their values are 8.38 and 8.21 respectively
whereas the maximum value of the remaining countries is about 6.46 (see Table 2 for the
30Note that while the raw data have a panel structure, we may not be able to come up with a panel
directly to estimate a panel regression because many variables are not contemporaneous.
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summary statistics of the sample). In the empirical analysis in Section 3, we drop these
two outliers.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable N Mean S.D. Min. 1st quart. Median 3rd quart. Max.
Innovationc 50 3.667 2.030 -1.553 2.698 3.696 5.038 7.996
Receptivityc 50 5.109 0.605 3.767 4.607 5.209 5.510 6.455
GDP per capita (log) 29 8.842 1.410 5.677 8.255 8.708 10.091 10.962
Population (log) 29 3.620 1.533 1.223 2.318 3.568 4.392 7.208
Index of patent rights 29 2.112 0.853 0.590 1.380 2.120 2.750 4.140
Years of tertiary schooling 29 17.572 11.236 0.586 9.700 16.800 21.871 52.914
FDI (as % of GDP) 29 0.607 0.609 -0.058 0.179 0.471 0.930 2.341
% religious people 29 0.659 0.216 0.098 0.528 0.746 0.821 0.939
% people believing in God 27 0.855 0.152 0.514 0.793 0.927 0.975 0.995
29
